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Legislative Activity and Private Benefits: A Natural Experiment in New Zealand

We examine the causal effect of legislative activity on private benefits, which have been largely neglected by previous research in legislative studies. By relying on a natural experiment in New Zealand, where randomly selected MPs are given the opportunity to propose legislation, we find evidence for a causal relation between proposing a (successful) bill and the private benefits MPs receive, in terms of gifts and payments for services. We conclude that the allocation of private benefits depends on legislative performance.

INTRODUCTION

What are the benefits of legislative activity? Formal and empirical research in legislative politics typically assumes that the main benefits are policy-oriented (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Krehbiel 1998; Martin 2004; Tsebelis 2002). In other words, by initiating legislation, MPs move the status quo of the policy closer to their ideal point. Other important benefits are electoral and career benefits: by initiating legislation, MPs send signals about their quality and performance to the electorate and party leaders, who in turn reward them (Bräuninger, Debus, and Wüst 2017; Bräuninger and Debus 2009; Gratton et al. 2015; Loewen et al. 2014). However, previous research has largely neglected another potential

motivation for legislative activity: private benefits.

In this research note, we investigate the causal effect of initiating legislation on private benefits. We define private benefits as payments and gifts received from private actors, such as private individuals, organizations and companies. We estimate the causal effect of legislative activity on private benefits by exploiting a natural experiment in New Zealand, where a list of Members of Parliament (MPs) is drawn at regular intervals of time through a lottery system and is given the possibility of introducing bills. Our findings suggest that initiating legislation affects the likelihood of receiving private benefits. We find that this effect is driven by those MPs who propose bills that are successfully passed in parliament. We conclude that private benefits depend on legislative performance.

We make sense of this finding by arguing that private actors allocate benefits to active and successful parliamentarians. Not only does legislative activity signal information on the parliamentarians' performance to the electorate and the party, but also to private actors. If a parliamentarian initiates bills that are adopted, the probability that she gets re-elected and becomes an influential policy-maker in future increases (Gratton et al. [2015](#); Horiuchi and John [2016](#); Loewen et al. [2014](#); Williams and Indridason [2018](#)). Hence, private actors allocate benefits to successful legislators to improve their reputation, access information and potentially influence future policy outcomes.

Political scientists have already studied (private) members' bills lotteries in Canada (Loewen et al. [2014](#)), the UK (Horiuchi and John [2016](#)) and, more recently, New Zealand itself (Williams and Indridason [2018](#)). Yet, to our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the effect of legislative activity on private benefits. The high frequency with which ballots take place and the disclosure of private interests make New Zealand the perfect case where to study this effect.

STUDY DESIGN

We first describe the New Zealand ballot and explain why the ballot represents a valid natural experiment. Then, we outline our estimation strategy and briefly discuss the data. A detailed discussion of the New Zealand ballot as well as of the data and the measurement of the variables can be found in the Appendix.

MPs in New Zealand that are not member of the cabinet can propose members' bills. The parliament usually debates members' bills on every second Wednesday of the month. The Order Paper, which contains the parliament's agenda, includes a limited number of members' bills to be discussed in the first reading. According to Standing Order 281, this limit is currently set to eight bills. If the parliament completes the first reading of a member's bill, a slot in the Order Paper becomes available. Then, the parliament selects a new member's bill via a ballot (i.e. a lottery).¹ To participate in the ballot, parliamentarians submit a notice of their proposal to the Clerk. The parliamentarians can only submit one proposal to the ballot. The bills that are not drawn are kept for the following ballots, until they are drawn in the lottery, the member withdraws them or the parliament term ends (New Zealand Parliament 2017). The legislative process in New Zealand usually takes three readings, but most members' bills fail in the first reading and do not become law. In addition, the government can veto proposals that have substantial budgetary implications. Detailed information on the member's bill ballot can be found in the Appendix.

We use this natural experiment, namely the random selection of members' bills in

¹There can be more than one slot available and hence more than one bill can be drawn in the ballot.

the New Zealand parliament, to estimate the causal effect of proposing a bill on private benefits. Our estimation strategy focuses on examining how being drawn in the ballot increases the chances for the MP to receive private benefits. The New Zealand ballot is especially suited to study the link between legislative activity and private benefits. First, little self-selection takes place. The majority of MPs who do not hold ministerial positions enter regularly the ballot every year: in New Zealand every time roughly 80 MPs enter the ballot.² Second, attrition levels are non-existent, namely in the period under analysis no MP is drawn and then fails to propose legislation. This is the case also in the UK (Horiuchi and John [2016](#)), but we suspect it is especially the case in New Zealand, where, differently from the UK (House of Commons [2016](#), [2010](#)), MPs need to present a complete draft to enter the ballot (since 2011) (New Zealand Parliament [2009](#), [2016](#)). Third, differently from similar procedures in place in other countries, such as the UK and Canada, the New Zealand ballot takes place more than once a year. Hence, our data exhibits more observations and higher variation.

Our study uses publicly available data on the members' bills in New Zealand. We focus on the period from 2009 until 2016, which includes 47 ballots. On average each ballot selects two bills from 80 entries. Our dataset includes 3056 entries in the ballot and 117 drawn members' bills. These drawn bills were proposed by MPs from the Labour party (51), the National party (27), the Greens (20), New Zealand First (11), the Maori Party (5), ACT (2) and Mana (1). We gathered data on whether the bill was drawn in the ballot; whether the bill passed and, if not, at which stage the bill was rejected; the dates of bill proposal and adoption or rejection. Out of the 117 bills, 16 were formally adopted.

²Williams and Indridason [2018](#) and Bowler [2010](#) show that the only determinant of proposing a bill in the New Zealand and British parliament, respectively, is previous vote share: MPs from safe seats tend to be less active.

The topics of the bills vary substantially and include areas such as finance, economic affairs, interior affair, environment, health and education.

We rely on unique data on the private benefits of New Zealand MPs. We measure private benefits by using the data from the *Register of Pecuniary and Other Specified Interests of Members of Parliament*, where MPs have to provide information on financial benefits outside the parliament. We focus on two types of benefits: gifts and payments for activities. Examples of gifts are trips and hospitality offered to MPs by companies and associations and examples of payments for activities are consulting fees.³ In the main analysis, we use an ordinal variable which takes value: 0 if the MP does not receive any gifts or payments in the same year of the ballot; value 1 if the MP receives either gifts or payments in that year; value 2 if the MP receives both gifts and payments in that year. In the Appendix, we use alternative measures of private benefits.

The regression analysis controls for a series of confounding factors: whether the MP acts as a chair of a parliamentary committee, as a measure for seniority; the ministerial experience of the MP, as a measure of the legislative experience; whether the MP was elected through electorate or party vote, as a measure of the MP's electoral incentives.⁴ The Appendix discusses in more detail data and measurement issues and includes descriptive statistics (see Table A1-A3 in the Appendix).

³A detailed description is provided in the Appendix.

⁴The election mechanism has strong implications on the MP's incentive structure and hence her behaviour. For instance, in Williams and Indridason (2018) proposing a bill in the New Zealand parliament is found to increase the likelihood of the MP to climb the party list (even though results are statistically weak). Yet, they find no relationship between proposing a bill and vote share, for those MPs elected by constituency.

RESULTS

We analyze the data in two steps. First, we investigate whether being drawn in the ballot is associated with receiving private benefits. Then, we examine whether the legislative outcome influences private benefits. Before analyzing the data, we run a balance test to confirm that the ballot selects bill proposals randomly (see Table A4 in the Appendix).

Table 1 shows the results of the ordered logistic regression model, which includes control variables. We analyze the relationship between a bill being drawn and the private benefits of the MP that proposed the bill. We control for the MP's party, the legislative period in which the ballot takes place and other control variables, such as the MP's seniority (whether she is a committee chair), whether she was elected via list or constituency and her previous cabinet experience. The full regression output can be found in Table A5 in the Appendix. We find a statistically significant and positive relationship between being drawn in the ballot and receiving private benefits. The probability of receiving either gifts or payments increases by 7 per cent after being drawn. The Appendix includes robustness checks.

In Models 4 and 5, we examine the effect of initiating legislation on different subsets of the data. We first remove those proposals which are drawn and rejected and then we remove those which are drawn and adopted. We find a statistically significant difference between those MPs who successfully passed a bill and those MPs whose bill was not drawn in the first place. Yet, no difference is present between those MPs whose bill was drawn but then rejected and those MPs whose bill was not drawn in the first place. We run a series of robustness checks in the Appendix.

Next, we test whether the success of the legislative proposal influences private benefits. We want to understand whether MPs are rewarded for proposing legislation that is adopted

TABLE 1 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Same Year - Ordinal)*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits				
	Full Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	Successful	Unsuccessful
Bill Drawn	0.336* (0.194)	0.326* (0.193)	0.380* (0.202)	1.550*** (0.528)	0.178 (0.215)
Observations	3,056	3,056	3,056	2,955	3,040
Controls		YES	YES	YES	YES
Party FE			YES	YES	YES
Legislative Period FE			YES	YES	YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

in the legislative process. Hence, we focus exclusively on the drawn bills and tests whether private benefits depend on whether the bill passes or not. The legislative success is likely to be correlated with a number of variables related to the seniority and experience of parliamentarians. We address this potential omitted variable bias by including the control variables discussed in the previous section.

Table 2 examines the effect of passing a bill on private benefits (Table A6 shows the full outputs of the regression model). The results show that legislative success affects the private benefits of MPs. This effect is robust to different specifications and measures of the outcome variable. If we focus on the successful bills, the predicted probability of receiving either gifts or payments increases by 36 per cent. In the Appendix we run some robustness tests.

Existing theoretical work on the role of signaling in legislative politics provides a rationale for these findings (Caselli and Morelli [2004](#); Mattozzi and Merlo [2008](#); Gratton et al. [2015](#); Buisseret and Bernhardt [2017](#)). Private actors have an incentive to allocate benefits to those MPs who are better able to influence policy-making. The private market updates its beliefs on the capacity of an MP to influence policy-making in future in two ways: by looking at her re-election probability and by looking at her probability to be a

TABLE 2 *The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Same Year - Ordinal)*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Passed	1.490** (0.594)	1.354** (0.615)	1.678** (0.745)
Observations	117	117	117
Controls		YES	YES
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

key decision-maker in future. In other words, the market allocates private benefits to those MPs who are more likely to stay in the parliament and to be key players in the foreseeable future.

The probability of re-election depends, among other things, on whether the MP proposes legislation. Williams and Indridason (2018) provide evidence for this in New Zealand. We argue that, instead, the market updates the probability of an MP to be a key decision-maker in the future based on her capacity to successfully pass legislation. Those MPs able to pass legislation in the current parliament exhibit the quality and the support from their parties needed to take an active role in the parliament in future. As a result, where an MP's bill is drawn and is successfully passed, both updates are positive: that MP will be more likely to be re-elected and will be more likely to play a central role in the parliament in future. That is why we find a statistically significant difference between those MPs who successfully passed a bill and those MPs whose bill was not drawn in the first instance. ⁵

⁵In the appendix, we show that MPs elected by list tend to be less likely to receive private benefits. This effect is not robust in all model specifications, but the direction of the effect provides indirect support for our argument. List MPs are less independent

Instead, if an MP's bill is drawn but is rejected by the parliament, her probability of being re-elected will increase, but her probability to influence policy-making in future will be lower. In other words, the two updates go in the opposite direction, balancing each other out. That is why we find no difference between those MPs whose bill was drawn but then rejected and those MPs whose bill was not drawn in the first place.

In conclusion, our findings suggest that private actors target active *and* successful parliamentarians. These parliamentarians are both more likely to be re-elected and more likely to be influential in the future. In contrast, parliamentarians that unsuccessfully propose a bill have a higher re-election probability, but are not necessarily more likely to become an influential decision-maker. Hence, private actors have fewer incentives to allocate benefits to this group.

CONCLUSION

By proposing (successful) legislation, MPs can increase their approval rate in their electorate (Williams and Indridason [2018](#)), their chances of being re-elected (Loewen et al. [2014](#)) and making a career inside the parliament (Horiuchi and John [2016](#)). In this study, we find that MPs also receive immediate private benefits, as a result for being more active and successful in the parliament. These benefits depend on whether the MP manages to push the bill through. Hence, we conclude that in parliament there are clear rewards in place for MPs to be more active.

These findings suggests that the market allocates private benefits to those MPs who are and more subject to the power of party leaders and hence less likely to be able to make an individual contribution to decision-making. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.

more likely to influence policy-making in future, which depends on the MP's probability to be re-elected and to be a key decision-makers in future. As a consequence, the private market rewards those MPs who propose bills that are successfully passed, because they are more likely to be re-elected and to be key policy-makers in future.

Future research may investigate the effect of legislative activity on parliamentarians' private benefits by using data on the monetary value of benefits. We believe it would be important to understand whether these benefits change the future behavior of politicians, the quality of legislation or even encourage entry of different type of politicians.

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Appendix:

Legislative Activity and Private Benefits:

A Natural Experiment in New Zealand

THE MEMBER'S BILL BALLOT IN THE NEW ZEALAND PARLIAMENT

Members of Parliament (MPs) who are not part of the government can introduce bills, outside the government's programme: these are called members' bills (until 1995, they were called private member bills). The purpose of members' bills is to amend previous legislation, gauge public attention to an issue and emphasise different party positions (McGee 1994). Member's bills can deal with different topics, but should have a minor fiscal impact on the state (until 1996 member's bills were not supposed to have any financial implication at all) (New Zealand Parliament 2014b). These bills are usually discussed every second Wednesday of the month, namely on Members' day. The parliament adopts a small number of member's bills (in our sample, 15 per cent of drawn bills become legislation), but all member's bills may still affect the government's agenda, by attracting attention to certain issues (New Zealand Parliament 2009, 2016, 2017).

MPs can draft the bill herself or seek legal advice. It is common practice that the MP consults with the party caucus to gather support from her party members, before putting the bill through (Spindler 2009). A member's bill can progress further and be written down in the Order Paper by being drawn in the ballot or by being introduced by leave. The

lottery system is by far the most common procedure (New Zealand Parliament 2017). In the latter procedure, the MP asks if there are objections for the bill to be placed on the Order Paper. In the last 10 years, only two member bills were introduced to the debate in this manner (New Zealand Parliament 2017).

The New Zealand Parliament selects the member's bills via a ballot. This ballot takes place when a space on the Order Paper becomes available.^[1] We first describe the participation rules for the ballot and then the procedure for selecting the member's bills (New Zealand Parliament 2009). Members enter their bills in the ballot, by giving notice to the Table Office and supplying a copy of the proposed bill (New Zealand Parliament 2009, 2016). The proposed bill is then posted on the parliament's website and members can publicly indicate their support for the bill prior to the ballot.^[2] Until 2011, members were only supposed to present a title and a brief description of the bill (New Zealand Parliament 2017). Members can only propose one bill at a time, but once their bill has been drawn, they can propose another one (New Zealand Parliament 2017). Also, parliamentarians cannot propose a bill if the parliament has already rejected the proposal in the same calendar year (New Zealand Parliament 2014b).

Each bill is numbered and assigned to a token, which is then placed into a metal tin. A politically neutral person draws a token for each vacant slot on the Order Paper (New Zealand Parliament 2017). The bills that are not selected are kept for the next ballot draw and re-numbered every time, until they are drawn, are withdrawn by the member or

¹The Order Paper can include up to eight bills. This number has increased throughout the years (New Zealand Parliament 2017).

²When two bills are the same in substance, a preliminary ballot between them is held to determine which one enters the ballot. As this has occurred only twice throughout the period under analysis, we decide to focus only on the final ballot and ignore the preliminary one in these cases.

reach the end of the parliament term (New Zealand Parliament [2017](#)).³ Every second Wednesday of the month the House discusses local, private and members' bills (New Zealand Parliament [2009](#), [2016](#)).

The number of ballots varies over years, from one in 2014 to nine in 2015 (no ballot is usually held during election years, even though one ballot was held in 2014). In the last seven years, a total of 47 draws have taken place. The frequency of ballots depends on the available discussion time.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Tables A1-A3 provide descriptive statistics of our main variables and the relative frequencies by party and legislative period.

Ballot Data

We use data on all 47 ballots, which took place in the period from 2009 until 2016. The ballots include on average 80 entries and on average three bills were drawn. Our analysis includes data from three legislative periods (2009-2011, 2011-2014, 2014-2017). We gathered data on every bill which enters the ballot: whether the bill was drawn in the ballot; whether the bill passed and, if not, at which stage the bill was rejected; the dates when the bill was introduced to the floor and when it was passed/rejected.⁴

³In the UK parliament this procedure is fully computerised.

⁴This information can be found [here](#) (last accessed July 2017).

Private Benefits

We draw information on private benefits from the registers of interests of MPs, which are available from 2006. ⁵ For every MP we have yearly information on her pecuniary interests. In August 2005 the House amended its Standing Orders to provide a system for members of Parliament to register these pecuniary interests. Standing Order 164 and Appendix B of the Standing Orders provide details on what needs to be registered and how to do so. These rules are amended every year. MPs declare their interests to the Registrar of Pecuniary and Other Specified Interests, who advises them about what information is required, and compiles their returns into the register. Once the register is complete, the Registrar gives it to the Speaker, who submits it to the House. The booklet contains the returns of those who were members at the time of publication and who were members as of 31 January. New members who enter after 31 January are required to make an initial return before the next round of annual return. This information, along with that in the registers filed by MPs after the deadline, is stored separately and was included in the analysis as well.

The register includes two main types of interests. The first type consists of the following interests: the involvement of the MP in companies, trusts and organizations in various role; employment outside the parliament; real properties owned by the MP; her debtors and creditors; the superannuation schemes in which she participates. For this type of interests the MP needs to report a snapshot of her interests at the effective date, which is 31 January. The second main type of interests comprises: gifts the MP received; discharged debts; payment for activities. These items are registered once, only for the year

⁵This information can be found [here](#) (last accessed July 2017).

to which they relate.

We choose to gather information on gifts and payment for activities, as these items best measure the private benefits derived from the parliamentary activity. The former include gifts received while travelling on official business, corporate hospitality and services provided at no cost, where the market value exceeds 500 dollars. Payments for activities include fees for activities, such as speaking engagements, book royalties and so on (New Zealand Parliament 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2015). Examples of payments for activities are consultancy fees from a tourism company to an MP involved in rural affairs and director's fees from a manufacturing company to an MP involved in small business affairs. Examples of gifts instead are tickets to a gala dinner from a private bank to an MP involved in industrial relations. Notice that the rules for the registration of interests change almost every year. However, we examined in detail the notes for the registers of interests and find that the definition of the various types of interests and the procedures did not change substantively.

As MPs do not have to report the exact figures, we measure private benefits as an ordinal variable which takes value: 0 if the MP does not receive any gifts or payments in the same year of the ballot; value 1 if the MP receives either gifts or payments in that year; value 2 if the MP receives both gifts and payments in that year (variable 'ordinal - same year'). We employ different measures and show the results in the Appendix. We also measure private benefits as a dichotomous variable which takes value 0 if the MP does not receive gifts or benefits and value 1 if she receives either one or the other, or both (variable 'dichotomous - same year'). Finally, we measure whether the MP receives gifts and/or payments for activities (as dichotomous variable) in the same year, if the ballot takes place before June, otherwise we look at the following year (we call this measure 'dichotomous - next year').

TABLE A1 *Descriptive Statistics*

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Bill Drawn	3,056	0.0383	0.192	0	1
Bill Passed	117	0.137	0.345	0	1
List v. Constituency	3,056	0.499	0.500	0	1
Cabinet Experience	3,056	0.425	0.494	0	1
Benefits (Dichotomous-Same Year)	3,056	0.284	0.451	0	1
Benefits (Dichotomous-Next Year)	2,508	0.247	0.431	0	1
Benefits (Ordinal-Same Year)	3,056	0.296	0.482	0	2
Chair	3,056	0.117	0.322	0	1

Other Variables

We have biographical data on every MP in our sample, namely the ministerial roles filled in the past. ⁶ We also have information on whether the MP was elected through electorate or party vote. Finally, we gathered data on whether the MP acts as parliamentary committee chair. ⁷ Finally, in the regressions we calculate party fixed effects by pooling all the observations from minor parties into a single category. We gathered all this information between the end of 2016 and the end of 2017.

⁶This information can be found [here](#) (accessed November 2016).

⁷This information was provided by the New Zealand Parliamentary Service (contacted November 2017).

TABLE A2 *Descriptive Statistics - Party*

Party	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Other (ACT, Mana, Progressive, United)	62	2.03	2.03
Green	609	19.93	21.96
Labour	1,257	41.13	63.09
Maori	65	2.13	65.22
National	744	24.35	89.56
NZ First	319	10.44	100.00
Total	3,056	100.00	

TABLE A3 *Descriptive Statistics - Legislative Period*

Legislative Period	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
First Period (2009-2011)	425	13.91	13.91
Second Period (2011-2014)	1,183	38.71	52.62
Third Period (2014-2017)	1,448	47.38	100.00
Total	3,056	100.00	

BALANCE CHECKS

As Table A4 shows, being drawn in the ballot does not depend on any individual characteristic of the MP. This means that the ballot is a true natural experiment, as it randomly selects MPs, regardless of how they are elected, their experience and so on. Hence, relying on the ballot allows estimating the causal effects of legislative activity on private benefits, controlling for the potential endogeneity in place. The legislative period is statistically associated with the likelihood of being drawn.⁸ This effect occurs because the baseline legislative period, 2009-2011, includes fewer entries to the ballot in comparison to the other periods. Thus, an entry to the ballot in the legislative periods 2011-2014 and 2014-2017 is less likely to be successful, with respect to an entry to the ballot in the 2009-2011 period.⁹

Finally, we check the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the variables in the regression models. The VIF measures how much variance of the coefficient of a variable is due to the fact that the variable is linearly related to the other variables in the model. The VIFs are well below the value 10 and hence we exclude high levels of multicollinearity.

⁸We dropped from the analysis those parties whose MPs were never drawn in the ballot during the period under analysis, namely the Progressive Party and the United Party.

⁹Usually no ballot is held during election years and, hence, there are no observations for 2011. In 2014, only one ballot was held. We do not consider observations from 2017 because the corresponding data on private benefits will be released in July 2017.

TABLE A4 *Balance Checks*

VARIABLES	Member Bill
	(1) Bill Drawn
List v. Constituency	-0.0187 (0.206)
Green	-0.127 (0.715)
Labour	-0.107 (0.699)
Maori	0.636 (0.783)
National	-0.0245 (0.731)
NZ First	0.0272 (0.749)
Chair	-0.0640 (0.309)
Cabinet Experience	0.269 (0.259)
Second Period (2011-2014)	-0.499* (0.259)
Third Period (2014-2017)	-0.489* (0.257)
Constant	-2.866*** (0.673)
Observations	3,056

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

In the following we provide the results of our robustness tests. Tables A7-A8 replicate the analysis in Table 2, but use the different measures of the outcome variable (private benefits). As stated, in the main body we measure whether the MP receives gifts and/or payments for activities in the same year of the ballot as an ordinal variable. In the Appendix we report the results also for the other measures. In Table A7 we measure private benefits as a dichotomous variable which takes value 0 if the MP does not receive gifts or benefits and value 1 if she receives either one or the other, or both (we call this measure ‘dichotomous - same year’). In Table A8 we measure whether the MP receives gifts and/or payments for activities (as dichotomous variable) in the same year if the ballot takes place before June, otherwise we look at the following year (we call this measure ‘dichotomous - next year’). The results are consistent. Finally, Table A9 replicates the results in Table 1 in the research note, but replaces party fixed effects with a dummy variable which measures whether the party was in government at that time. It should be noted that throughout the period of analysis New Zealand had the same parties in government: National, United, ACT and Maori parties. The results are robust and become stronger after controlling for parties in government.

Table A10 shows the full regression outputs for the first three columns in Table 3. Tables A11-12 replicate the results for the first three columns in Table 3 with the different measures of private benefits as outcome variables. We also employ rare event estimation, with the Stata package ‘firthlogit’ (Tables A13-14). A statistically significant relation is found between the two variables in all the different specifications. Table A15 replicates the results for the last three columns in Table 3, Tables A16-A17 use the different measures for private benefits and Tables A18-A19 use the the package ‘firthlogit’. No statistically

significant relationship between the two main variables is found here.

Tables A20-A21-A22 replicate Table 1-2 in the research note, but we collapsed the dataset at bill level. Presenting a bill affects the likelihood of receiving private benefits. The results are even stronger than in the main analysis. As shown in Table A21-A22, the findings on the successful bill are consistent with our main analysis. Finally, Table A23 uses the generalized ordinal logit model with the Stata `gologit2` `autofit` option.

TABLE A5 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Full Output*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	0.336* (0.194)	0.326* (0.193)	0.380* (0.202)
List v. Constituency		-0.346 (0.293)	-0.726** (0.313)
Cabinet Experience		0.474 (0.289)	0.628 (0.472)
Chair		0.788** (0.349)	0.329 (0.348)
Observations	3,056	3,056	3,056
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A6 *The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Full Output*

Private Benefits			
VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Passed	1.490** (0.594)	1.354** (0.615)	1.678** (0.745)
List v. Constituency		0.025 (0.488)	-0.406 (0.488)
Cabinet Experience		0.006 (0.476)	0.784 (0.678)
Chair		0.822 (0.597)	0.067 (0.623)
Observations	117	117	117
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A7 *The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year)*

Private Benefits			
VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Passed	1.325** (0.549)	1.205** (0.565)	1.206* (0.643)
List v. Constituency		0.036 (0.504)	0.104 (0.507)
Cabinet Experience		0.020 (0.492)	1.002 (0.779)
Chair		1.053 (0.644)	0.123 (0.710)
Constant	-0.815*** (0.235)	-0.949*** (0.330)	-1.697* (1.024)
Observations	117	117	117
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A8 *The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year)*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Passed	1.623*** (0.583)	1.527** (0.595)	1.274** (0.641)
List v. Constituency		-0.350 (0.618)	-0.722 (0.659)
Cabinet Experience		-0.173 (0.628)	0.966 (1.142)
Chair		0.507 (0.873)	-0.250 (0.832)
Constant	-1.371*** (0.312)	-1.150*** (0.436)	1.100 (1.899)
Observations	100	100	100
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A9 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Government*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits - Government		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	0.336* (0.194)	0.326* (0.193)	0.389** (0.197)
List v. Constituency		-0.346 (0.293)	-0.576** (0.292)
Cabinet Experience		0.474 (0.289)	0.901*** (0.329)
Chair		0.788** (0.349)	0.139 (0.334)
Government			1.021*** (0.341)
Observations	3,056	3,056	3,056
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A10 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Successful Bills-Full Output*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	1.659*** (0.613)	1.556*** (0.589)	1.550*** (0.528)
List v. Constituency		-0.365 (0.294)	-0.750** (0.316)
Cabinet Experience		0.505* (0.288)	0.627 (0.468)
Chair		0.772** (0.351)	0.337 (0.347)
Observations	2,955	2,955	2,955
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A11 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year) - Successful Bills*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	1.448*** (0.539)	1.387*** (0.526)	1.381*** (0.482)
List v. Constituency		-0.357 (0.295)	-0.735** (0.309)
Cabinet Experience		0.526* (0.292)	0.706 (0.479)
Chair		0.772** (0.343)	0.317 (0.336)
Constant	-0.938*** (0.146)	-1.097*** (0.237)	-0.526 (0.862)
Observations	2,955	2,955	2,955
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A12 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year) - Successful Bills*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	1.368*** (0.509)	1.331*** (0.510)	1.127** (0.482)
List v. Constituency		-0.263 (0.333)	-0.734** (0.365)
Cabinet Experience		0.434 (0.326)	0.345 (0.432)
Chair		0.503 (0.389)	0.027 (0.353)
Constant	-1.116*** (0.162)	-1.257*** (0.258)	-0.944 (0.875)
Observations	2,424	2,424	2,424
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A13 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year) - Successful Bills - Rare Event*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	1.417*** (0.501)	1.355*** (0.511)	1.345** (0.536)
List v. Constituency		-0.356*** (0.090)	-0.731*** (0.104)
Cabinet Experience		0.524*** (0.088)	0.700*** (0.150)
Chair		0.771*** (0.121)	0.317** (0.146)
Constant	-0.937*** (0.0410)	-1.096*** (0.064)	-0.515* (0.285)
Observations	2,955	2,955	2,955
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A14 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year) - Successful Bills - Rare Event*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	1.352*** (0.491)	1.314*** (0.497)	1.106** (0.507)
List v. Constituency		-0.262** (0.103)	-0.729*** (0.116)
Cabinet Experience		0.433*** (0.100)	0.341** (0.163)
Chair		0.504*** (0.141)	0.030 (0.169)
Constant	-1.116*** (0.047)	-1.255*** (0.074)	-0.916 (0.327)
Observations	2,424	2,424	2,424
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A15 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Ordinal - Same Year) - Unsuccessful Bills - Full Output*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	0.119 (0.203)	0.123 (0.207)	0.178 (0.215)
List v. Constituency		-0.342 (0.295)	-0.722** (0.314)
Cabinet Experience		0.469 (0.290)	0.615 (0.477)
Chair		0.783** (0.354)	0.341 (0.350)
Observations	3,040	3,040	3,040
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A16 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year) - Successful Bills Dropped*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	0.123 (0.205)	0.127 (0.209)	0.185 (0.217)
List v. Constituency		-0.332 (0.296)	-0.708** (0.308)
Cabinet Experience		0.488* (0.293)	0.684 (0.488)
Chair		0.776** (0.348)	0.318 (0.340)
Constant	-0.938*** (0.146)	-1.093*** (0.236)	-0.383 (0.883)
Observations	3,040	3,040	3,040
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A17 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year) - Unsuccessful Bills*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	-0.255 (0.274)	-0.258 (0.280)	-0.274 (0.288)
List v. Constituency		-0.250 (0.336)	-0.716* (0.366)
Cabinet Experience		0.395 (0.331)	0.285 (0.443)
Chair		0.518 (0.389)	0.049 (0.352)
Constant	-1.116*** (0.162)	-1.246*** (0.257)	-0.784 (0.904)
Observations	2,492	2,492	2,492
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A18 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Same Year) - Unsuccessful Bills- Rare Event*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	0.132 (0.218)	0.136 (0.221)	0.192 (0.230)
List v. Constituency		-0.331*** (0.088)	-0.705*** (0.102)
Cabinet Experience		0.487*** (0.087)	0.679*** (0.149)
Chair		0.776*** (0.120)	0.318* (0.144)
Constant	-0.937*** (0.041)	-1.091*** (0.064)	-0.376 (0.276)
Observations	3,040	3,040	3,040
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A19 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Dichotomous - Next Year) - Unsuccessful Bills - Rare Event*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	-0.234 (0.272)	-0.237 (0.274)	-0.253 (0.283)
List v. Constituency		-0.250** (0.102)	-0.711*** (0.114)
Cabinet Experience		0.394*** (0.099)	0.282* (0.162)
Chair		0.519*** (0.153)	-0.050 (0.167)
Constant	-1.116*** (0.0473)	-1.244*** (0.0742)	-0.762* (0.311)
Observations	2,492	2,492	2,492
Party FE			YES
Legislative Period FE			YES

Clustered errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A20 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Collapsed) - Bill Level*
Private Benefits - Collapsed

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Drawn	0.423** (0.213)	0.413* (0.216)	0.406* (0.221)
List v. Constituency		0.0338 (0.217)	-0.221 (0.219)
Cabinet Experience		0.227 (0.208)	0.664*** (0.242)
Chair		0.621** (0.254)	0.0424 (0.276)
Constant	-0.965*** (0.109)	-1.155*** (0.163)	-2.490*** (0.346)
Observations	679	679	679
Party FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A21 *The Effect of Bill Passed on Private Benefits (Collapsed) - Bill Level*
Private Benefits - Collapsed

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bill Passed	1.234** (0.561)	1.110* (0.585)	0.991 (0.609)
List v. Constituency		0.0948 (0.450)	-0.138 (0.472)
Cabinet Experience		-0.148 (0.449)	0.553 (0.554)
Chair		0.997 (0.649)	0.0111 (0.666)
Constant	-0.723*** (0.215)	-0.800** (0.317)	-2.715*** (0.741)
Observations	117	117	117
Party FE			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A22 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Collapsed) - Successful and Unsuccessful Bills - Bill Level*

VARIABLES	Private Benefits - Collapsed					
	Successful	Successful	Successful	Unsuccessful	Unsuccessful	Unsuccessful
Bill Drawn	1.871 (1.245)	1.747 (1.150)	1.351 (1.174)	-0.101 (0.427)	-0.109 (0.439)	-0.0952 (0.430)
List v. Constituency		0.0008 (0.237)	-0.271 (0.253)		0.077 (0.221)	-0.237 (0.237)
Cabinet Experience		0.363 (0.223)	0.0695 (0.335)		0.195 (0.213)	-0.102 (0.341)
Chair		0.532* (0.276)	0.380 (0.309)		0.568** (0.264)	0.432 (0.294)
Constant	-0.945*** (0.108)	-1.169*** (0.171)	-0.557 (0.597)	-0.921*** (0.104)	-1.110*** (0.162)	-0.120 (0.532)
Observations	578	578	577	663	663	662
Party FE			YES			YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A23 *The Effect of Bill Drawn on Private Benefits (Generalized Ordinal Logit)*

Private Benefits					
VARIABLES	Full Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	Successful	Unsuccessful
0					
Bill Drawn	0.336* (0.194)	0.326* (0.193)	0.390* (0.199)	1.538*** (0.503)	0.191 (0.217)
List v. Constituency		-0.346 (0.293)	-0.396 (0.294)	-0.423 (0.294)	-0.394 (0.296)
Cabinet Experience		0.474 (0.289)	0.732** (0.333)	0.767** (0.330)	0.726** (0.335)
Chair		0.788 (0.349)	0.476 (0.353)	0.460 (0.354)	0.476 (0.356)
Observations	3,056	3,056	3,056	2,955	3,040
Party FE			YES	YES	YES
Legislative Period FE			YES	YES	YES
1					
Bill Drawn	0.336* (0.194)	0.326* (0.193)	0.390* (0.199)	1.538*** (0.503)	0.191 (0.217)
List v. Constituency		-0.346 (0.293)	-0.396 (0.294)	-0.423 (0.294)	-0.394 (0.296)
Cabinet Experience		0.474 (0.289)	0.732** (0.333)	0.767** (0.330)	0.726** (0.335)
Chair		0.788 (0.349)	0.476 (0.353)	0.460 (0.354)	0.476 (0.356)
Observations	3,056	3,056	3,056	2,955	3,040
Party FE			YES	YES	YES
Legislative Period FE			YES	YES	YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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